China’s intentions of creating territorial tensions and
conflicts in the neighborhood far and near has left the world in a tizzy. Its coercive
adamancy in South China Sea, its inimical designs for Japan and South Korea vis
a vis North, antagonistic overtures to India and tiny nations of South Asia
directly and indirectly including playing with Nepal’s fears of Indian
aggression, its fomenting Pakistan’s anti India adventures, its Tibet and Taiwan
ownership, are all but few signs of a nation’s hegemonistic nausea.
conflicts in the neighborhood far and near has left the world in a tizzy. Its coercive
adamancy in South China Sea, its inimical designs for Japan and South Korea vis
a vis North, antagonistic overtures to India and tiny nations of South Asia
directly and indirectly including playing with Nepal’s fears of Indian
aggression, its fomenting Pakistan’s anti India adventures, its Tibet and Taiwan
ownership, are all but few signs of a nation’s hegemonistic nausea.
India China have reached a point of serious war mongering
on Doklam trijunction with both sides refusing to withdraw after 70 days of
standoff in a more than eyeball to eyeball confrontation. If we listen to what China says we need to
vacate the Doklam area which belongs to them as against Bhutanese claims.
Doklam, or as the Chinese call it Donglang, is the trijunction on Bhutan-India-China
border. In the OBOR outreach China was caught on the wrong foot constructing
road across the Bhutanese border that is of high strategic value for India
giving it an edge at peeping at our chicken neck juncture.
on Doklam trijunction with both sides refusing to withdraw after 70 days of
standoff in a more than eyeball to eyeball confrontation. If we listen to what China says we need to
vacate the Doklam area which belongs to them as against Bhutanese claims.
Doklam, or as the Chinese call it Donglang, is the trijunction on Bhutan-India-China
border. In the OBOR outreach China was caught on the wrong foot constructing
road across the Bhutanese border that is of high strategic value for India
giving it an edge at peeping at our chicken neck juncture.
Although there’s nothing new in both India and China
flexing their muscles over territorial issues, China’s ambitious initiative of
One Belt One Road, a multilayered project aimed at far reaching imperialistic
designs smartly crafted is germane to it. Its impressive economics are equally justifiable.
flexing their muscles over territorial issues, China’s ambitious initiative of
One Belt One Road, a multilayered project aimed at far reaching imperialistic
designs smartly crafted is germane to it. Its impressive economics are equally justifiable.
Emboldened by its belligerent advances in the South China
sea and a fairly successful One China Policy, China assumed its unhindered passage
through Bhutanese territory would have been a cake walk. At stake Bhutanese and Indian strategic and
security interests, the retaliation by India in terms of troops build up in
Doklam was a blow to Chinese grand design of engulfing the South Asian region
bit by bit.
sea and a fairly successful One China Policy, China assumed its unhindered passage
through Bhutanese territory would have been a cake walk. At stake Bhutanese and Indian strategic and
security interests, the retaliation by India in terms of troops build up in
Doklam was a blow to Chinese grand design of engulfing the South Asian region
bit by bit.
Its not just the matter of India being in pact with
Bhutan over being a security guarantor, our concern articulates a larger
hemisphere of the challenge it poses to India’s sovereignty. Incidentally events
like these take years to finally come to resolve. And considering the fact that
the Chinese Congress is due later half of this year the stand off will be
taking longer. Ineluctably domestic politics is something that no nation can
overlook. Historically Wangdung in the eastern sector took 1986 to 1992 to be
resolved. Sumdrochung stand-off continued for nearly a decade before there was
an agreed mutual withdrawal. Ever since Tibet in 1960 it was always a militarized relationship between the two Asian giants although since Sikkim
integration this kind of public spatting has not been seen like the present one
on Doklam.
Bhutan over being a security guarantor, our concern articulates a larger
hemisphere of the challenge it poses to India’s sovereignty. Incidentally events
like these take years to finally come to resolve. And considering the fact that
the Chinese Congress is due later half of this year the stand off will be
taking longer. Ineluctably domestic politics is something that no nation can
overlook. Historically Wangdung in the eastern sector took 1986 to 1992 to be
resolved. Sumdrochung stand-off continued for nearly a decade before there was
an agreed mutual withdrawal. Ever since Tibet in 1960 it was always a militarized relationship between the two Asian giants although since Sikkim
integration this kind of public spatting has not been seen like the present one
on Doklam.
The Chinese chose to change the status quo this year when
the season came. So why did they do
the season came. So why did they do
it? Ostensibly there’s no legal argument that they are
pursuing on where the trijunction is, neither is there any possibility of a
huge military gain for them right now. They are also well aware of India’s
hefty presence with a fair amount of dominance, so there has to be some other
gain.
pursuing on where the trijunction is, neither is there any possibility of a
huge military gain for them right now. They are also well aware of India’s
hefty presence with a fair amount of dominance, so there has to be some other
gain.
Interestingly China is a nation in a hurry. Its vision of
being at the top emanates from its obsessed nationalism and its history of
colonialism. The fous et origen of China’s expansionist misadventures mirrors its
sense of insecurity and so as a policy, nationalism thus becomes a crucial
element in legitimizing Communist party rule.
being at the top emanates from its obsessed nationalism and its history of
colonialism. The fous et origen of China’s expansionist misadventures mirrors its
sense of insecurity and so as a policy, nationalism thus becomes a crucial
element in legitimizing Communist party rule.
The sloganeering of ‘China Dream’ by Xi leverages Chinese
nationalism directly to the nation’s economic prosperity and globalization. Be
it OBOR, One China Policy, South China Sea or China Dream, all are manifestations
of the same simmering aspiration. BRI other than connectivity, is anchored in
China’s domestic as well as foreign policy. Additionally it also addresses the
problem of overcapacity of its domestic market giving Beijing a seamless
opportunity to spread its political influence along with global dominance aggressively.
nationalism directly to the nation’s economic prosperity and globalization. Be
it OBOR, One China Policy, South China Sea or China Dream, all are manifestations
of the same simmering aspiration. BRI other than connectivity, is anchored in
China’s domestic as well as foreign policy. Additionally it also addresses the
problem of overcapacity of its domestic market giving Beijing a seamless
opportunity to spread its political influence along with global dominance aggressively.
China suffers from what Luttwak, a US strategy Expert,
called ‘Great Power Autism’, as analysts rightly put it. Something that leaves
the power insensitive to others concerns, which is what is happening to Chinese
diplomacy. The hurry to become ‘the’ world power, (which it will be in future
with the collapsing west), can be attributed to the fact of the expediency of
its rise, accumulation of much hard power and its ascendency to power on the
international stage. Characteristically Chinese are also apprehensive because
they are not used to it and so not sure of it. Their moment of strategic
opportunities, for them is ‘now’ when their relative power is probably the
highest, maybe the highest it will be. Multiple factors like demography, their
apprehension of a strategic push back, the power’s non feasibility, that they
might grow old before they grow rich, ecology, the fear of not being able to
sustain what they have achieved so far, how will their society absorb it, then
where do they go, seem to be a cause of anxious worry to them. What they have achieved
in such a short span of time is incredible and also the reason of their arrogance.
The logical outcome then will be counterbalancing.
called ‘Great Power Autism’, as analysts rightly put it. Something that leaves
the power insensitive to others concerns, which is what is happening to Chinese
diplomacy. The hurry to become ‘the’ world power, (which it will be in future
with the collapsing west), can be attributed to the fact of the expediency of
its rise, accumulation of much hard power and its ascendency to power on the
international stage. Characteristically Chinese are also apprehensive because
they are not used to it and so not sure of it. Their moment of strategic
opportunities, for them is ‘now’ when their relative power is probably the
highest, maybe the highest it will be. Multiple factors like demography, their
apprehension of a strategic push back, the power’s non feasibility, that they
might grow old before they grow rich, ecology, the fear of not being able to
sustain what they have achieved so far, how will their society absorb it, then
where do they go, seem to be a cause of anxious worry to them. What they have achieved
in such a short span of time is incredible and also the reason of their arrogance.
The logical outcome then will be counterbalancing.
Again media plays a major role in propagating political
decisions and building up phony war rhetoric. In China like in all communist
countries media is not free. Everything in China is official and have their
assigned functions. Global times is like their pitbull, to make sure that China
news gets everywhere with big noises. People’s Daily and Zinhua articulate what
is being told by the parties to their cadres and so more realistic. What has
changed is Chinese signaling has shifted. They have realized the larger utility
of creating noise to the people and social media has played a pivotal role in
this direction. The one constant is the psychological pressure tactics used by
them on other countries to fulfill their agenda. Noticeably Doklam standoff has
been no issue for Chinese media including their social media. It’s the US North
Korea engagements thats sending jitters to the press and people.
decisions and building up phony war rhetoric. In China like in all communist
countries media is not free. Everything in China is official and have their
assigned functions. Global times is like their pitbull, to make sure that China
news gets everywhere with big noises. People’s Daily and Zinhua articulate what
is being told by the parties to their cadres and so more realistic. What has
changed is Chinese signaling has shifted. They have realized the larger utility
of creating noise to the people and social media has played a pivotal role in
this direction. The one constant is the psychological pressure tactics used by
them on other countries to fulfill their agenda. Noticeably Doklam standoff has
been no issue for Chinese media including their social media. It’s the US North
Korea engagements thats sending jitters to the press and people.
As per Defense sources China will not risk an all-out war
in the Doklam area as it is well aware of its disadvantageous position at
Sikkim Bhutan China trijunction. As a policy by needling in Pangong Tso lake in
eastern Ladakh and Barahoti in Himachal it is ratchting up pressure to
unilaterally withdraw. By standing by Thimpu in the case of Chinese
interception India has been successful in sending a terse message across. Seen
in the larger context it is this challenge of authority that is irking China.
On home turf China is in a churn. Politically President Jingping is to face the
19th Congress to establish himself and consolidate power, economically
China is not doing too well and militarily its undergoing the greatest
reformation and are not in a state of readiness to fight a war. Xi on the other
hand has pitched himself to his as people as someone who positions himself with
Trump. As opposed to Trump he has vouched for globalization and climate change,
taken firm stands on SCS and OBOR to impress upon his constituency. Internationally
China is under great pressure from US to bring North Korea under control with
whom China has immense trade relations. US threatens sanctions on China if it
does not make Pyongyang fall in line. China is already messed up in South China
Sea.
in the Doklam area as it is well aware of its disadvantageous position at
Sikkim Bhutan China trijunction. As a policy by needling in Pangong Tso lake in
eastern Ladakh and Barahoti in Himachal it is ratchting up pressure to
unilaterally withdraw. By standing by Thimpu in the case of Chinese
interception India has been successful in sending a terse message across. Seen
in the larger context it is this challenge of authority that is irking China.
On home turf China is in a churn. Politically President Jingping is to face the
19th Congress to establish himself and consolidate power, economically
China is not doing too well and militarily its undergoing the greatest
reformation and are not in a state of readiness to fight a war. Xi on the other
hand has pitched himself to his as people as someone who positions himself with
Trump. As opposed to Trump he has vouched for globalization and climate change,
taken firm stands on SCS and OBOR to impress upon his constituency. Internationally
China is under great pressure from US to bring North Korea under control with
whom China has immense trade relations. US threatens sanctions on China if it
does not make Pyongyang fall in line. China is already messed up in South China
Sea.
As for Bhutan China relations China does not have an
embassy in Thimpu which China is trying hard for negotiating bilateral issues.
Chinese have to dish out 250 dollars in advance to enter Bhutan as opposed to
free entry of Indians in the Himalayan state. But Bhutan is well aware that
once China comes into Bhutan will not be the same.
embassy in Thimpu which China is trying hard for negotiating bilateral issues.
Chinese have to dish out 250 dollars in advance to enter Bhutan as opposed to
free entry of Indians in the Himalayan state. But Bhutan is well aware that
once China comes into Bhutan will not be the same.
Despite China having made so much noise on Doklam, India chose
to stay away from the bellicose rhetoric. Refusing to playing in their hands
India’s quiet diplomacy worked to our advantage not just in passive support of India
from powers like US and Japan but it also helped in reigning in worsening of the
war mongering accompanied with media flare ups. Our restrained reaction kept
the Chinese guessing too, blunting their war of perception to comatose.
to stay away from the bellicose rhetoric. Refusing to playing in their hands
India’s quiet diplomacy worked to our advantage not just in passive support of India
from powers like US and Japan but it also helped in reigning in worsening of the
war mongering accompanied with media flare ups. Our restrained reaction kept
the Chinese guessing too, blunting their war of perception to comatose.
Doklam standoff is here to stay, say Defence sources, as technically
no trijunction issues with China are in a condition of resolution till the entire
LAC of 4,057 km is sorted out. India’s in a commanding position in this 89 sq kilometer
area and China is testing us to buckle in. Neither did President Xi Jingping
mention Doklam in his address on August 1 nor did PM Modi talk of it in his ID
day speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort. It would be a long haul before
the forces finally withdraw, as history teaches us.
no trijunction issues with China are in a condition of resolution till the entire
LAC of 4,057 km is sorted out. India’s in a commanding position in this 89 sq kilometer
area and China is testing us to buckle in. Neither did President Xi Jingping
mention Doklam in his address on August 1 nor did PM Modi talk of it in his ID
day speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort. It would be a long haul before
the forces finally withdraw, as history teaches us.
Surely the India of 1962 is not the same as China of 1962.
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